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Abstract
This paper relates physical and mental health status to labor force par-
ticipation and compares these relationships among self-report and proxy
respondents. Previous research has conjectured that self-reports of health
status may lead to an upward bias in the estimated e⁄ect of health on
labor productivity because subjects who are out of the labor force may be
more likely to understate their health status so as to justify their lack of
employment. Also, we integrate mental health into our study by using two
alternative approaches-logistic regression analysis and propensity scoring
methods. We ￿nd that among the cohort of self-reporters, physical health
has a substantially stronger impact on labor productivity than mental
health; precisely the opposite patterns were obtained when physical and
mental health status were reported by proxy respondents. These results
suggest the self-reports may lead to a bias in estimating labor produc-
tivity costs of physical versus mental health on labor force participation
by overestimating the importance of good physical health and underes-
timating the role of good mental health. This in turn suggests that the
bene￿ts of more generous mental health insurance bene￿ts may have been
underappreciated in the medical policy debates.
Keywords: health economics, propensity scoring, logistic regression,
self-reported health, labor force participation, mental health.
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11 Introduction
The impact of health on labor productivity is a topic of considerable interest in
the labor and health economics literatures. Growing recognition of the indirect
labor productivity costs associated with poor health and chronic disease has
raised the interest of policymakers as well. Previous research (e.g., Bound, 1991)
has conjectured that self-reports of health status may lead to an upward bias in
the estimated e⁄ect of health on labor productivity. The reason is that subjects
who are out of the labor force may be more likely to understate their health
status so as to justify their lack of employment. This e⁄ect is believed to be
more prevalent among males than females. However, the dearth of information
relating mental health status to labor force participation and the di¢ culties
in quantifying the relative importance of physical health versus mental health
in e⁄ecting labor productivity suggest that linkages between health and labor
force participation may not be ￿rmly established. Empirical evidence on these
issues would be quite useful to self-insuring employers who are designing health
insurance bene￿ts packages, and in policymakers concerned with understanding
the full social bene￿ts of alternative health insurance plans.
In this paper we apply two alternative methodological approaches, logistic
regression analysis and propensity scoring methods, to analyze treatment e⁄ects
among labor force participation, physical, and mental health status. We utilize
a unique set of data, the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS). We use the
MEPS to relate physical and mental health status to labor force participation
and we compare these relationships among self-report and proxy respondents.
The MEPS is well-suited to this purpose because it includes both measures of
physical and mental status as well as self-reports and proxy responses to ques-
tions regarding physical and mental health. In the MEPS survey, members of a
subject￿ s household responded to questions regarding the subject￿ s physical and
mental health status when the subject was unavailable to answer the surveyor￿ s
questions. Both logistic regression analysis and propensity scoring approaches
condition on respondents￿age, education and race. Separate analyses are con-
ducted for males and females.
Methodologically, treatment e⁄ects have been a topic of interests in the
literature for some time although recent interest appears to center on issues of
robustness. Robins (1999) has suggested a class of new class of non-nested
marginal structural models that may be used to estimate the causal e⁄ects of
time dependent treatment on a binary outcome while Hernan et. al. (2001)
recently has applied this method in model of joint outcomes. Since it was ￿rst
introduced by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) propensity scoring, which examines
the conditional probability of receiving treatment given pre-treatment variables,
has been motivated by its non-parametric methodology. It eliminates bias due
to an assumed (and incorrect) parametric relationship between the outcome
and the observed covariates whose parametric relationship with the outcome
variable is unknown. Imbens (1999) extended this methodology to allow for
estimation of average causal e⁄ects with multi-valued treatments.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section we discuss in more
2detail the empirical evidence that links labor force participation and health.
We also examine whether such linkages appear in the MEPS using multivariate
logistic regression methods. Section 3 provides theoretical treatments and the
rationale behind propensity scoring methods and propensity score binning in
particular. Section 4 discusses the results of our propensity scoring analyses
and their implications. Section 5 concludes.
2 Evidence from the Medical Expenditure Panel
Survey
The data in our study is a national representative sample of males whose ages
varied between 18 and 64. A total of 3,374 subjects reported physical and mental
health status by a proxy (someone in that male￿ s household). Another 2,449 self-
reported their physical and mental health status. Multivariate logistic regression
models, adjusting for age, race and education, were estimated to establish a
relationship among physical and mental health status, and the probability of
being in the labor force. The results indicate that physical health has a much
stronger impact on labor force participation for those who self-report than for
those whose reports are by proxy. In contrast, mental health has a weaker
e⁄ect when self-reports are used. This pattern appears to re￿ ect the tendency
for subjects who are out of the labor force to self-report their physical and mental
health di⁄erently than proxy-respondents. Among unemployed subjects, self-
reporters are more likely to indicate that their physical health status is poor or
fair (the reference cohort). On the other hand, self-reporters are more likely to
indicate that their mental health status is good or better. the information can
be summarized in the following table where a subject is considered healthy when
his physical condition is reported to be ￿ good￿ , ￿ very good￿or ￿ excellent￿ .
Table 1: Frequencies of Labor Force Participation by Mode of Representation





These discrepancies are all the more striking as proxy and self reports were
found to be remarkably similar among subjects who were in the labor force.
An interpretation of these results is that subjects who are out of the labor
force tend to understate their physical health status and overstate their mental
health status. This would lead to a stronger estimate of the impact of physical
health on labor force participation among self-reporters, and a correspondingly
weaker e⁄ect of mental health status; this is precisely what has been observed.
An other interpretation is that subjects out of the labor force ￿nd it easier to
blame a physical ailment ￿ real or imagined￿ on their (negative) labor force
3status than to admit they are su⁄ering from emotional di¢ culties that limit
their productivity.
Causality clearly may go both ways. Being out of the labor force can greatly
a⁄ect one￿ s mental health status. Su⁄ering from emotional and psychological
di¢ culties also has an impact on labor force participation. The combination of
these factors may have a role in biasing self-reports of subjects out of the labor
force. These respondents tend to downplay their emotional a⁄ection and may
blame their employment status on a physical ailment, real or imagined.
Since most studies of health and labor force participation have relied only
on self-reports (c.f., Sickles and Taubman, 1996), then if the bias discussed
above is true, it would suggest that existing studies may be overstating the
importance of physical health status on labor productivity, and understating
that of mental health status. Thus when allocating health care dollars to
promote worker productivity, relatively more dollars should be spent on mental
health bene￿ts and relatively less on physical health bene￿ts. These ￿ndings
could thus have important implications for the optimal design of employer-based
health insurance plans. However, if the causality is reversed, social structures
and health care for the unemployed could be made more e⁄ective by focusing
on addressing emotional and psychological de￿cits.
In the next section we attempt to isolate the casual linkages between health
conditions and labor force participation utilizing robust nonparametric proce-
dures. Since there is no evidence that proxy and self-reports have been randomly
assigned, the problem of sample selection of subjects may be an issue. Propen-
sity scoring methods were employed to deal with the selection bias that arises
in such a situation. The methods are introduced below.
3 Propensity Scoring
Propensity scoring methods were ￿rst introduced by Rosenbaum and Rubin
(1983) as a way to signi￿cantly reduce bias in observational studies. Early
applications found in the biometrics literature analyze medical treatment e⁄ects.
Propensity scoring techniques have been found to be an e¢ cient alternative to
most common econometric bias-reducing techniques (e.g. Heckman￿ s two-step
estimation procedure). The objective is to statistically evaluate the e⁄ect of a
particular treatment on a population (e.g. the e⁄ect of smoking on mortality).
A randomized experiment with human subjects would be not only unethical but
also impractical. Observational data are typically used in such cases to study
causal e⁄ects.
The main problem in observational studies is that selection for treatment is
not randomized. Therefore, the treated and the non-treated may di⁄er in char-
acteristics other than treatment intake. In an example provided by Cochran
(1986), the yearly death rates of the cigarette-smoking population in the U.S.
are identical to that of the non-smoking population: 13.5 per thousand in 1968.
This would suggest that cigarette-smoking has little to no e⁄ect on mortal-
ity. This conclusion is, of course, incorrect. Cigarette smokers di⁄er from non-
4smokers in characteristics other than smoking habits; one of the most important
of these characteristics is their age. Indeed, in Cochran￿ s studies, the average
age for a non-smoker in 1968 was 57 years-old and 53 years of age for a ciga-
rette smoker. In other words, non-smokers were found signi￿cantly older than
cigarette-smokers. Failure to take into account these di⁄erences in age would
not result in meaningful conclusions. When controlling for di⁄erences in age,
the mortality rate of cigarette-smokers climbed to 17.7 per thousand while that
of non-smokers remained at 13.5 per thousand. These ￿gures are in accor-
dance with other studies about the subject. In this smoking example, in order
to control for age, one can compare di⁄erent smoking-habit groups that have
the same age distribution. One practical solution is to reweigh the sample so
that the distribution of age for di⁄erent smoking-habit groups is approximately
the same. In the smoking example, the weights that have been chosen were
simply the sample frequencies of the age subgroups for non- smokers ￿ here,
three subgroups of approximately equal size; this explains why the mortality
rate for non-smokers remained unchanged in the process. The main concept
behind propensity scoring methods is very similar to what has been done in this
example and is developed in the next subsection.
The reweighing method becomes intractable when we want to control for
more than one characteristic, or covariate. We need a one-dimensional vari-
able that would summarize background characteristics accurately in the sense
that subjects with similar values of this proxy would have similar background
characteristics. The propensity score is precisely that.
We need to introduce some notation in order to better explain how propen-
sity scoring can be used in our context. Let yi and xi denote the values of
the observed outcome and covariate variables for subject i. Let z￿ denote the
observed treatment assignment that takes on binary values; i.e. z￿
i = 1 if the
treatment has been assigned to subject i, z￿
i = 0 otherwise. The propensity
score is de￿ned as the probability of receiving the treatment given the value of
the covariates.
p(xi) = Prfz￿
i = 1jxig = propensity score for subject i:
The joint distribution of the covariates and the observed treatment given
the propensity score is given by:
Prfx;z￿jp(x)g = Prfxjp(x)g ￿ Prfz￿jx;p(x)g
= Prfxjp(x)g ￿ Prfz￿jxg
= Prfxjp(x)g times p(x) or 1 ￿ p(x)
= Prfxjp(x)g ￿ Prfz￿jp(x)g.
where it is assumed that x and z￿ are conditionally independent given the
propensity score p(x).
Since the objective of propensity scoring methods is to match subjects with
similar background characteristics regardless of the treatment they receive one
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egories (bins) according to their propensity score. This procedure is called
propensity score binning and can be decomposed in the following ￿ve steps1.
Step 1 Model the probability of receiving the treatment (z￿ = 1) given the
covariates (x). This is usually done through a logistic regression with
linear functional x>￿.
Step 2 Sort all observations on the estimated propensity score, p(x) = pfz￿ =
1jxg.
Step 3 Form ￿ve (or more) relatively homogenous subgroups (bins) of subjects
with similar estimated propensity scores by dividing ￿tted probabilities
into quintiles (or ￿ner divisions).
Step 4 Calculate a mean outcome di⁄erence, ￿ yk;z￿=1 ￿ ￿ yk;z￿=0, within each
subgroup k.
Step 5 Form an overall average di⁄erence, ￿ yz￿=1 ￿ ￿ yz￿=0, using appropriate
weights.
The appropriate weights indicated in step 5 are usually proportional to the
number of subjects within each bin or to the inverse of the variance of the
propensity score within each bin. The overall di⁄erence from the latter option
will always appear to be more precise, but this weighing typically downweighs
results from the outer (￿rst and last) bins. The overall di⁄erence using weights
proportional to the sample frequencies of each bin (usually nearly equal across
bins) may be much less biased as it is practically insensitive to outliers. Indeed,
outliers can greatly in￿ ate within-bin variances because within-bin sample sizes
are reduced by a factor of ￿ve or more (depending on the number of subgroups).
It may not seem reasonable at ￿rst that this method requires estimating the
probability that each subject receives the treatment since we already know which
subjects were assigned a particular treatment. However, if we use the probability
that a subject would have been treated given his values of the covariates (the
propensity score, precisely) in order to adjust our estimates of the treatment
e⁄ect, we can create a ￿ quasi-randomized￿ experiment. In other words, two
subjects (regardless of their treatment intake) who have similar propensity scores
can be thought of having the same ex ante probability of being assigned the
treatment or among subjects with similar propensity scores. One can imagine
that subjects were ￿ randomly￿ assigned the treatment in the sense of being
equally likely to be treated or control.
1See Obenchain, [9] and [10].
64 Propensity Scoring and the Relationship be-
tween Health and Labor Force Participation
In this section we utilize propensity scoring techniques to analyze the relation-
ship between health and labor force participation. Propensity score binning
is applied to subjects whose health conditions have been proxy-reported and
to self-reporters, separately. In the former, however, it may be reasonable to
divide subjects in two groups according to their treatment assignment, and then
apply propensity score binning where the ￿ pseudo-treatment￿is now whether
subjects self-report their health status. When evaluating the extent of the re-
porting bias itself, propensity score binning will be applied to subjects out of
the labor force only, taking mode of representation as the ￿ pseudo-treatment￿ ;
this will measure the e⁄ect of self-reporting (the treatment) on reported health
(the outcome variable) for subjects out of the labor force; i.e. the reporting bias
we are after.
4.1 Impact of Health on Labor Force Participation
We ￿rst analyze the e⁄ect of health (the treatment) on labor force participation.
We apply propensity score binning to the proxy-reported subjects and to the
self-reporters separately. For each estimation, we obtain two estimates of the
e⁄ect of health on labor force participation: one using sample frequency within
each bin as a weighing scheme when averaging across bins, the other using the
inverse of the within-bin variance as weights. The following numerical results
were chie￿ y obtained thanks to the S-Plus propensity scoring functions designed
by Bob Obenchain2. The main results are presented in Table 2.
Table 2: Impact of Health on Labor Force Participation Estimation Results
Proxy report Self report
Raw Average Treatment Di⁄erence 0.232017 0.4294142
Standard Deviation of Raw Di⁄erence 0.03305922 0.02505341
Average within Bin Treatment Di⁄erence 0.1558927 0.2848299
Standard Deviation of Average within Bin Di⁄erence 0.09007506 0.0656173
Inverse Variance Weighted Di⁄erence 0.1910878 0.350969
Standard Deviation of Inverse Variance Di⁄erence 0.0323359 0.02486205
For the subgroup of subjects whose health status was reported by a proxy,
the marginal increment in the probability of being in the labor force due to good
health condition is of 16% (resp. 19%) when using within-bin sample frequency
(resp. the inverse of the within-bin variance) as a weighing scheme. In other
words, being in good health increases one￿ s chances of being in the labor force
by 16 to 19%. When selection bias is not taken into account, the ￿ raw￿e⁄ect
is estimated at 23%.
2At this time, these functions are available online at the following URL:
http://www.math.iupui.edu/~indyasa/bobodown.htm
7As for the subgroup of subjects who self-reported their health status, the
marginal increment in the probability of being in the labor force due to good
health condition is of 28% (resp. 35%) when using within-bin sample frequency
(resp. the inverse of the within-bin variance) as a weighing scheme. In other
words, all other things being equal, a subject who considered himself in good
health had a probability of being in the labor force greater than that of someone
considering himself in poor health by 28 to 35%. The estimated raw impact is
43%.
These results are remarkable in several ways. First of all, these numbers
corroborate the fact that the impact of physical health reports on labor force
participation is greater for self-reporters, which was expected. What is most
striking, however, is that even though proxy reports signi￿cantly down-play the
e⁄ect of health on labor force participation, this e⁄ect is still quite important;
this suggests that the proxy reports provide us with somewhat of a lower bound
for our estimates. Finally, we observe a reduction in the di⁄erence between the
e⁄ects on proxy- and self-reported when a bias-reducing method is employed.
4.2 Impact of Labor Force Participation on Health
It is quite reasonable to expect labor force participation to have an impact
on health. Subjects out of the labor force may su⁄er emotionally and feel
discarded and/or stigmatized (especially being males); also, as emotional and
psychological di¢ culties often translate into physical symptoms, their physical
health may be a⁄ected. This could help explain why males out of the labor force
are statistically in poorer health condition than employed subjects. Moreover,
the discrepancies between proxy and self-reports of physical health status may
also be understood thanks to this approach. Indeed, the stigma associated with
being unemployed along with the stigma associated with depression (especially
for males, once again) may lead these subjects to misreport (consciously or
subconsciously) their physical health status.
We apply propensity score binning estimation separately to the proxy-reported
subjects and on the self-reporters. For each estimation, two values of the es-
timate of the e⁄ect of labor force participation on health are given; one uses
sample frequency within each bin as a weighing scheme when averaging across
bins, the other uses the inverse of the within-bin variance as weights. The results
are presented in Table 3.
Table 3: Impact of Labor Force Participation on Health Estimation Results
Proxy report Self report
Raw Average Treatment Di⁄erence 0.1814896 0.3378763
Standard Deviation of Raw Di⁄erence 0.02651639 0.02132619
Average within Bin Treatment Di⁄erence 0.2325843 0.2652681
Standard Deviation of Average within Bin Di⁄erence 0.09727791 0.05495876
Inverse Variance Weighted Di⁄erence 0.1309656 0.2911695
Standard Deviation of Inverse Variance Di⁄erence 0.02531794 0.02191314
8For the subgroup of subjects whose health status was reported by a proxy,
the marginal increment in the probability of being in good health due to being
in the labor force is of 23% (resp. 13%) when using within-bin sample frequency
(resp. the inverse of the within-bin variance) as a weighing scheme. In other
words, under the hypothesis made in this segment of the paper, being in the
labor force increases one￿ s chances of being in good health by 13 to 23%. The
estimated raw e⁄ect is 18%.
As for the subgroup of subjects who self-reported their health status, the
marginal increment in the probability of being in good health due to being in
the labor force is of 27% (resp. 29%) when using within-bin sample frequency
(resp. the inverse of the within-bin variance) as a weighing scheme. In other
words, all other things being equal, a subject who is in the labor force has 27
to 29% greater chance of considering himself in good health than someone out
of the labor force. The estimated raw e⁄ect is 34%.
Again, estimates are greater for self-reporters. These last two averages are
very similar, this suggests that there are few outliers in the sample. However,
the results obtained with the proxy-reported cohort are quite di⁄erent, which
suggest the presence of outliers; thus, the weighted average using sample fre-
quency as weights (23%) should be more reliable. Again, the e⁄ects obtained
are quite important, even when selection bias is taken care of, and are lower
than, yet comparable to, the raw e⁄ect.
4.3 Measuring the Reporting Bias
??, shows that health reports for self-reporters out of the labor force were sig-
ni￿cantly lower than that for proxy-reported subjects. We suspected that this
discrepancy is due to a direct relationship between labor force participation and
health status. We applied a bias-reducing method in order to isolate the impact
of labor force participation on health status ￿ and vice versa￿ on self-reporters
and on the proxy-reported group separately. The result is that these e⁄ects are
di⁄erent although more comparable than ?? suggested. One possible reason for
this is that the way the data has been gathered is itself biased. We applied
propensity score binning to the cohort out of the labor force (regardless of who
reported their health status) in order to isolate the ￿ e⁄ect￿of self-reporting on
health. It turns out that this e⁄ect is quite small compared to what could have
been expected. The results are presented in Table 4.
Table 4: Reporting Bias Estimation Results
Raw Average Treatment Di⁄erence -0.1597055
Standard Deviation of Raw Di⁄erence 0.03327768
Average within Bin Treatment Di⁄erence -0.05576054
Standard Deviation of Average within Bin Di⁄erence 0.08102068
Inverse Variance Weighted Di⁄erence -0.05230291
Standard Deviation of Inverse Variance Di⁄erence 0.03170674
9The estimated raw bias is 20% but the ￿ bias-less￿e⁄ect of self-reporting is
only 5-6%. One interpretation of this result is that there is a selection problem
in ￿ choosing￿ who would be the self-reporters and who would be the proxy-
reported subjects. The self-reporters may self-reported precisely because their
poor health constrained them to stay at home and they were thus available for
the survey.
Since the ￿ e⁄ective￿impact of self-reporting is actually much smaller than
what ?? suggests, it is not surprising that the di⁄erence between estimates for
proxy- and self-reporters is not as great as what could have been expected.
Nevertheless, this impact exists and must be taken into consideration.
These results are striking. Among the cohort of self-reporters, physical
health has a substantially stronger impact on labor productivity than mental
health; precisely the opposite patterns were obtained when physical and mental
health status were reported by proxy respondents. Speci￿cally, among self-
reporting males, results from the propensity score estimates reveal that labor
force participation is 27 % greater when subjects are in good or excellent health.
The corresponding ￿gure for proxy respondent is 17 %. In contrast, labor force
participation is 24 % higher among male self-reporters in good or excellent
mental health, but 33 % larger when proxy respondents are used. Similar re-
sults are obtained with the logistic regression analysis. the results for females
following a similar, though less pronounced, pattern.
The reasons for this di⁄erence appear due to di⁄erent responding patterns
between self-reporters and proxies regarding physical and mental health status.
Among males, for example, 54 % of self-reporters who were out of the labor force
reported themselves to be in good or excellent health, while proxy respondents
reported that 73 % of subjects out of the labor force were in good or excellent
physical health. Precisely the opposite pattern occurs in reporting with respect
to mental health status. It in the In this case, 82% of self-reporters indicate that
they are in good or excellent mental health status, while only 79% of subjects
out of labor force are rated as being in good or excellent mental health status.
These results suggest the self-reports may lead to serious bias in estimat-
ing labor productivity costs of physical versus mental health on labor force
participation, by overestimating the importance of good physical health an un-
derestimating the role of good mental health. This in turn suggests that there
may be a role for relatively more generous mental health insurance bene￿ts.
5 Conclusion
The paper relates physical and mental health status to labor force participation
and compares these relationships among self-reporter and for proxy respondents.
We used two alternative approaches-logistic regression analysis and propensity
scoring methods, each approach condition on respondents￿age, education and
race.
The results suggest that the self-reports may lead to a bias in estimating
labor productivity costs of physical versus mental health on labor force partic-
10ipation, by overestimating the importance of good physical health an underes-
timating the role of good mental health. This in turn suggests that there may
be a role for relatively more generous mental health insurance bene￿ts. More
speci￿cally, existing studies on which the design of health insurance plans is
based have mostly relied on self-reports. Since there is evidence that these self
reports are biased, there is a great possibility that existing employer-based in-
surance plans are not optimal. Here, we tried to isolate the e⁄ective impact of
health on labor force participation. This approach will be a useful tool in the
design of more e¢ cient employer-based insurance plans. Results also suggest
that this impact is substantial even when stripped of the reporting bias but that
it is signi￿cantly lower than that inferred from self-reports.
In this paper, we also examined the relationship between physical health and
labor force participation using a somewhat di⁄erent approach. Our hypothesis
is labor force participation has a strong impact on health and therefore, we
can have a psychosomatic interpretation: there is a chain reaction from ￿ being
unemployed￿to ￿ su⁄ering from physical symptoms￿ . This approach appears to
be useful when we consider the allocation of spending in social structures for
the unemployed. The e⁄ects are smaller after reducing the bias but are still
quite signi￿cant.
Both free-of-bias impacts measured for self-reporters turned out to be some-
what close to what could have been inferred from Table 1. This raises the
question of whether there exists a signi￿cant reporting bias. In order to answer
this question, we applied the same bias-reducing method (propensity score bin-
ning) on the unemployed cohort (regardless of reporting procedure) to isolate
the impact of ￿ self-reporting￿on ￿ reported health￿ . Numerical results suggest
that this impact is signi￿cant though much lower than expected￿ 6% instead of
16%￿ and, as a consequence, that the ￿ choice￿of whether a subject is proxy-
or self-reported is extremely non-random and greatly biased towards unhealthy
self-reporters. One possible interpretation is that unemployed subjects who
are in poor health condition tend to be more available at home than healthier
subjects.
116 Appendix I-The Medical Expenditure Panel
Survey (MEPS) Data
The data set used for this paper is a full year 1996 Household Component
consolidated Data ￿le (HC-012) from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey
(MEPS). The variable extracted from this data set are described below.
LABFOR Binary Variable (BV) = 1 if subject is in the labor force; else =0.
HEALTHY BV =1 if reported health of the subject is ￿ good￿ , ￿ very good￿
or ￿ excellent￿ ; else =0.
AGE18343 BV =1 if subject aged 18-34; else =0.
AGE4554 BV =1 if subject aged 45-54; else =0.
AGE5565 BV =1 if subject aged 55-65; else =0.
NOHS4 BV =1 if subject did not attend high school; else =0.
SOMEHS BV =1 if subject attended but did not graduate from high school;
else =0.
SOMECOLL BV =1 if subject attended but did not graduate from college;
else =0.
COLLGRAD BV =1 if subject is a college graduate; else =0.
GRADSCHL BV =1 if subject attended graduate school; else =0.
HISPANIC5 BV =1 if subject is Hispanic; else =0.
BLACK BV =1 if subject is African American; else =0.
OTHRACE BV =1 if subject is of other non-white race; else =0.
SELFRESP BV =1 if subject self-represented his health condition; else =0.
3Reference age cohort is 35-44.
4Reference education cohort is high school education.
5Reference race group is white.
127 Appendix II-Logistic Regression Results
Table 5-Results from Proxy Reports
Parameter Estimate Standard Error Chi-square Pr>ChiSq
Intercept 2.1813 0.4563 22.8539 <.0001
hlthexc 1.2349 0.4057 9.2675 0.0023
hlthvg 1.0824 0.3570 9.1944 0.0024
hlthgood 0.4798 0.3074 2.4366 0.1185
hlthpoor -0.7711 0.3765 4.1940 0.0406
mlthexc 1,7791 0.4154 18.3554 <.0001
mlthvg 1.5771 0.4145 15.2000 <.0001
mlthgood 1.1839 0.3657 10.4807 0.0012
mlthpoor -1.2143 0.5659 4.6046 0.0319
age1834 -0.9714 0.3779 6.6075 0.0102
age4554 -1.0537 0.3588 8.6263 0.0033
age5564 -2.7290 0.3349 66.4042 <.0001
nohs -0.5127 0.3342 2.3537 0.1250
somehs -0.1465 0.3003 0.2380 0.6256
somecoll 0.0183 0.3240 0.0032 0.9550
collgrad 0.1835 0.3857 0.2265 0.6341
gradschl 0.3320 0.4478 0.5494 0.4585
hispanic 0.5547 0.3118 3.1642 0.0753
black -0.2629 0.3063 0.7369 0.3906
othrace 0.1815 0.6642 0.0746 0.7847
13Table 6-Results from Self Report
Parameter Estimate Standard Error Chi-square Pr>ChiSq
Intercept 0.7329 0.3439 4.5406 0.0331
hlthexc 2.0461 0.2950 48.1147 <0.0001
hlthvg 1.5650 0.2643 35.0750 <0.0001
hlthgood 1.3810 0.2441 32.0099 <0.0001
hlthpoor -1.1769 0.3062 14.7690 0.0001
mlthexc 1.2156 0.3104 15.3343 <0.0001
mlthvg 1.4438 0.3196 20.4038 <0.0001
mlthgood 0.9414 0.3020 9.7193 0.0018
mlthpoor -0.5967 0.6370 0.8777 0.3488
age1834 -0.0332 0.2805 0.0140 0.9057
age4554 -0.3730 0.2610 2.0430 0.1529
age5564 -2.4688 0.2415 104.4716 <0.0001
nohs -0.4087 0.3084 1.7559 0.1851
somehs -0.6523 0.2456 7.0528 0.0079
somecoll 0.0685 0.2399 0.0816 0.7751
collgrad 0.1599 0.2762 0.3352 0.5626
gradschl 0.00176 0.3041 0.0000 0.9954
hispanic 0.8127 0.2807 8.382 0.0038
black -0.3862 0.2319 2.7726 0.0959
othrace 0.6365 0.5460 1.3587 0.2438
14Estimation of the e⁄ect of health on
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Table 7-Estimation of the direct e⁄ect on proxy-reporters
Coe¢ cients Value Std. Error t value
Intercept 2.6777175 0.2046813 13.0823774
AGE1834 0.2823608 0.2197123 1.2851389
AGE4554 -0.8776531 0.2231059 -3.9337957
AGE5565 -1.3319584 0.2379992 -5.5964822
NOHS -0.6006229 0.2755286 -2.1798935
SOMEHS -0.6853505 0.2294515 -2.9869084
SOMECOLL 0.7840215 0.2255925 3.4753876
COLLGRAD 0.9163796 0.2613299 3.5066012
GRADSCHL 1.7332922 0.3727030 4.6505993
HISPANIC -0.5398733 0.1913124 -2.8219465
BLACK -0.9078931 0.2214222 -4.1002805
OTHRACE -0.3659532 0.4520527 -0.8095367
Table 8-Correlation of Coe¢ cients
(Intercept) AGE1834 AGE4554 AGE5565 NOHS SOMEHS
AGE1834 -0.6184003
AGE4554 -0.6605102 0.5853671
AGE5565 -0.6101941 0.5490948 0.5511841
NOHS -0.1388347 -0.0022162 0.0036449 -0.0206877
SOMEHS -0.1921420 -0.1029693 -0.0005667 -0.0303273 0.2762547
SOMECOLL -0.3149545 0.0339930 0.0031446 0.0133492 0.1797715 0.2326071
COLLGRAD -0.2712112 0.0338795 0.0024102 -0.0379662 0.1469217 0.1936892
GRADSCHL -0.1970960 0.0333021 -0.0126118 -0.0301042 0.1002941 0.1310080
HISPANIC -0.3310053 -0.0441280 0.0761193 0.0685336 -0.3479526 -0.1717387
BLACK -0.2464559 -0.0635043 0.0167087 0.0333071 -0.0083066 -0.0151766
OTHRACE -0.1001362 -0.0436780 -0.0251642 0.0180434 -0.0372268 -0.0173057
Table 8 (continued)









HISPANIC 0.0739044 0.0920318 0.0749595
BLACK -0.0174633 0.0147794 0.0335910 0.2811911
OTHRACE 0.0093811 -0.0422876 0.0110207 0.1496658 0.1174859
16Table 9-Estimation of the direct e⁄ect on self-reporters
Coe¢ cients Value Std. Error t value
(Intercept) 1.89977772 0.1363685 13.9312059
AGE1834 0.78676980 0.1639703 4.7982456
AGE4554 -0.30127060 0.1576668 -1.9108050
AGE5565 -0.90047152 0.1507847 -5.9719042
NOHS -1.03551816 0.1962409 -5.2767713
SOMEHS -0.84565413 0.1829074 -4.6234015
SOMECOLL 0.53672480 0.1496793 3.5858311
COLLGRAD 1.22933918 0.2185395 5.6252492
GRADSCHL 1.08334098 0.2084939 5.1960329
HISPANIC -0.03413954 0.1543593 -0.2211693
BLACK -0.66087222 0.1515056 -4.3620325
OTHRACE -0.13999465 0.3017320 -0.4639701
Table 10-Correlation of Coe¢ cients
(Intercept) AGE1834 AGE4554 AGE5565 NOHS SOMEHS
AGE1834 -0.5098055
AGE4554 -0.5646113 0.4623342
AGE5565 -0.6189303 0.4745455 0.5090807
NOHS -0.2206865 0.0206923 0.0077221 -0.0371620
SOMEHS -0.2519280 -0.0559883 -0.0293530 -0.0151666 0.2505598
SOMECOLL -0.4168726 0.0343134 0.0240404 0.0474792 0.2516465 0.2816133
COLLGRAD -0.2612937 0.0003965 -0.0110890 -0.0105320 0.1707920 0.1893999
GRADSCHL -0.2749218 0.0362348 -0.0349459 -0.0227533 0.1791437 0.1949544
HISPANIC -0.2450677 -0.0928869 0.0240479 0.0995133 -0.2909566 -0.1161175
BLACK -0.2335040 -0.0468231 0.0270920 0.0580948 -0.0457615 -0.0725550
OTHRACE -0.0952808 -0.0596441 -0.0171938 0.0207383 -0.0829279 -0.0068297
Table 10 (continued)









HISPANIC 0.0445727 0.0473390 0.0455268
BLACK -0.0367938 -0.0027055 0.0096205 0.2111868
OTHRACE 0.0115776 -0.0495118 -0.0431278 0.1379878 0.1133385
17Estimation of the e⁄ect of labor force
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Table 11-Estimation of the direct e⁄ect on proxy-reporters
Coe¢ cients Value Std. Error t value
(Intercept) 3.36054562 0.2448693 13.7238320
AGE1834 -1.63806980 0.2384672 -6.8691608
AGE4554 -0.75720165 0.2871384 -2.6370615
AGE5565 -1.96938668 0.2726974 -7.2218760
NOHS -0.66928463 0.2669143 -2.5074887
SOMEHS -0.56964307 0.2125012 -2.6806587
SOMECOLL 0.39892901 0.1887624 2.1133919
COLLGRAD 0.65624220 0.2260319 2.9033173
GRADSCHL 0.69844895 0.2553392 2.7353774
HISPANIC -0.05201517 0.1786209 -0.2912043
BLACK -0.98517917 0.1860746 -5.2945391
OTHRACE -0.76996806 0.3341771 -2.3040719
Table 12-Correlation of Coe¢ cients
(Intercept) AGE1834 AGE4554 AGE5565 NOHS SOMEHS
AGE1834 -0.8387522
AGE4554 -0.7054372 0.7156976
AGE5565 -0.7399210 0.7525245 0.6273870
NOHS -0.1175768 0.0111593 -0.0060176 -0.0165806
SOMEHS -0.1512310 -0.0440214 -0.0043997 -0.0256582 0.2668396
SOMECOLL -0.2723961 0.0172927 0.0088490 0.0157612 0.1946537 0.2665163
COLLGRAD -0.2306278 0.0176350 0.0099243 -0.0261018 0.1538496 0.2158331
GRADSCHL -0.2234835 0.0370786 -0.0013017 -0.0259535 0.1357679 0.1859404
HISPANIC -0.2063337 -0.0258571 0.0379493 0.0361517 -0.3455750 -0.1852521
BLACK -0.1864687 -0.0155731 0.0040317 0.0350431 -0.0002709 -0.0256784
OTHRACE -0.0814936 -0.0249522 -0.0193137 0.0238536 -0.0442892 -0.0346177
Table 12 (continued)









HISPANIC 0.0804601 0.1027945 0.0999059
BLACK -0.0149013 0.0257541 0.0492945 0.2587503
OTHRACE 0.0068188 -0.0634760 0.0127076 0.1601539 0.1373109
19Table 13-Estimation of the direct e⁄ect on self-reporters
Coe¢ cients Value Std. Error t value
(Intercept) 2.059150967 0.1343294 15.3291113
AGE1834 0.006406614 0.1420324 0.0451067
AGE4554 -0.050658722 0.1636326 -0.3095883
AGE5565 -1.713336817 0.1419293 -12.0717651
NOHS -0.745710927 0.1968959 -3.7873352
SOMEHS -0.798535425 0.1762538 -4.5305991
SOMECOLL 0.377363351 0.1336331 2.8238763
COLLGRAD 0.878178527 0.1737453 5.0544006
GRADSCHL 0.650039880 0.1692235 3.8413095
HISPANIC -0.028386529 0.1425542 -0.1991280
BLACK -0.853420564 0.1361675 -6.2674316
OTHRACE -0.783704537 0.2254438 -3.4762750
Table 14-Correlation of Coe¢ cients
(Intercept) AGE1834 AGE4554 AGE5565 NOHS SOMEHS
AGE1834 -0.6064877
AGE4554 -0.5478817 0.5118485
AGE5565 -0.6647572 0.5774316 0.5165996
NOHS -0.2070514 0.0374324 -0.0015806 -0.0141380
SOMEHS -0.2443213 -0.0350757 -0.0322345 0.0104730 0.2270804
SOMECOLL -0.4106835 0.0272511 0.0262928 0.0362218 0.2458328 0.2849296
COLLGRAD -0.2829906 -0.0051334 -0.0011865 -0.0299167 0.1862119 0.2130457
GRADSCHL -0.3033743 0.0401537 -0.0246918 -0.0368089 0.1933922 0.2149910
HISPANIC -0.2264972 -0.0849216 0.0212521 0.0869445 -0.2739518 -0.1173173
BLACK -0.2411076 -0.0322696 0.0238348 0.0988645 -0.0362526 -0.0530523
OTHRACE -0.1104667 -0.0755547 -0.0129289 0.0539466 -0.0646487 0.0048099
Table 14 (continued)









HISPANIC 0.0479907 0.0534850 0.0514001
BLACK -0.0265625 -0.0110436 0.0134207 0.2141088
OTHRACE 0.0006136 -0.0737926 -0.0692231 0.1547503 0.1468046
20Table 15-Estimation of the reporting bias
Coe¢ cients Value Std. Error t value
(Intercept) 1.354332773 0.2648608 5.11337516
AGE1834 -1.698627982 0.2684028 -6.32865307
AGE4554 -0.632042016 0.3177594 -1.98905826
AGE5565 -0.029482088 0.2865840 -0.10287417
NOHS 0.204485812 0.2834031 0.72153693
SOMEHS 0.229043567 0.2464133 0.92950982
SOMECOLL 0.395526682 0.2245955 1.76106236
COLLGRAD 0.008283243 0.2875954 0.02880173
GRADSCHL 0.338133070 0.2988733 1.13135923
HISPANIC -0.122712343 0.2089599 -0.58725293
BLACK 0.131540746 0.2102827 0.62554227
OTHRACE 0.563540501 0.3710736 1.51867602
Table 16-Correlation of Coe¢ cients
(Intercept) AGE1834 AGE4554 AGE5565 NOHS SOMEHS
AGE1834 -0.7619490
AGE4554 -0.6873993 0.6743890
AGE5565 -0.7725232 0.7426144 0.6303560
NOHS -0.1710152 0.0080728 0.0062792 -0.0320976
SOMEHS -0.1930244 -0.0669203 0.0157417 0.0111114 0.2572353
SOMECOLL -0.2353789 -0.0795095 -0.0063167 -0.0173412 0.2524999 0.3085231
COLLGRAD -0.1914057 -0.0693520 0.0275512 -0.0562542 0.1996790 0.2244001
GRADSCHL -0.2005237 -0.0254146 0.0055910 -0.0271502 0.1786811 0.2144099
HISPANIC -0.1788754 -0.1021378 -0.0332495 0.0537711 -0.1956676 -0.1406460
BLACK -0.2336323 -0.0182373 0.0225324 0.0889131 -0.0344587 -0.0958557
OTHRACE -0.0939054 -0.0741737 0.0147944 0.0403233 -0.1012095 0.0061735
Table 16 (continued)









HISPANIC 0.0287082 0.0609277 0.0655299
BLACK -0.0181689 0.0757528 0.0006213 0.3011063
OTHRACE -0.0193396 -0.0765121 0.0356291 0.1961641 0.1647513
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